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Abstract

We employed an instrumental case study of a multi-system hydroelectric power producer,
a high-reliability organization (HRO), to explore how new knowledge is created in a context in
which errors may result in destruction, catastrophic consequences, and even loss of human life.
The findings indicate that knowledge creation is multilevel, nested within three levels of paradox:
paradox of knowing, paradox of practice, and paradox of organizing. The combination of the lack
of opportunity for errors with the dynamism of the HRO context necessitates that individuals work
through multiple paradoxes in order to generate and formalize new knowledge. The findings
contribute to the literature on knowledge creation in context by explicating the work practices
associated with issue recognition, resolution, and refinement, and the formalization of knowledge in
failure-intolerant organizations.
Keywords: case study; high-reliability organization (HRO); knowledge creation; paradox theory
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THE PARADOX OF KNOWLEDGE CREATION IN A HIGH-RELIABILITY
ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY
Nestled within the rugged mountains and shielded from the curious eye of outsiders, the
power plant can best be described as a truly elegant, beautiful lady . Upon entering the gates, we
saw that what makes it powerful is also what makes it perilous. In front of the main entrance stood a
monument dedicated to those who lost their lives to
exterior left anything uncertain, our first encounter with the massive machines revealed the immense
power of this plant. Several events in its history stood as a reminder that a failure to appreciate the
may result in catastrophe. Thus, mistake-free operation of this plant is a continuous
objective and one that can only be supported by knowledge shared and created by those working in
it amid massive, powerful, and at times dangerous, machines. To operate reliably in such a context is
to understand how knowledge expands and shapes every thought and action.
Knowledge in high-reliability organizations (HROs) takes a different form due to their
ambiguous, continuously evolving and dangerous nature (Bierly, & Spender, 1995; La Porte &
Consolini 1991; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Weick and Roberts (1993: 357) describe HROs as
organizations that require nearly error-free operations all the time because otherwise they are
capable of experiencing catastrophes. In HROs, emphasis is placed on enacting repositories of
knowledge and reinforcing established procedures and routines (McIver et al., 2013; Roberts, 1990).
Individuals rely on an existing repertoire of routinized behavior to act swiftly, yet mindfully, when
faced with a potentially dangerous problem (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006).
However, the dynamism of the HRO context often generates unpredictable and nonroutine
problems where previous knowledge is insufficient and new knowledge must be created. Extant
research suggests that in the face of nonroutine problems, experimentation and errors catalyze new
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knowledge creation (McIver et al., 2013; Schulz, 2001). Individuals think through previously-made
errors to create new knowledge that can then be utilized in similar situations (McIver et al., 2013;
Zhao, 2011). Yet, relying on errors may be challenging in a context where a misstep can create fatal
consequences. That is, some organizations must not make serious errors because their work is too
important and the effects of their failures too disastrous (La Porte & Consolini, 1991: 57).
Given this, HROs require strict rules and careful enactment of current knowledge to ensure
reliability (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). At the same time, these
organizations must allow for rule-breaking and questioning of current knowledge when faced with
poorly understood, nonroutine problems (McIver et al., 2013; Roberts, 1990). In other words, in
HROs, individuals must both enact and challenge current knowledge as they search for solutions to
the problem amidst potentially hazardous circumstances. Therefore, the process of knowledge
creation in HROs seems to be paradoxical: individuals must enact current knowledge to comprehend
a given problem, but also challenge current knowledge because it may not be appropriate for solving
the problem (Garud, Dunbar, & Bartel, 2010; Roberts, 1990). The idea of paradoxes in HROs has
been suggested (Roberts, 1990), but, to our knowledge, not conceptually or empirically explored.
Building on the paradoxical nature of knowledge in HROs, we ask: How is new knowledge
created in this context? We take an emic approach to explore paradoxes within the knowledge
creation process in the dangerous context of HROs. We follow the framework put forth by Nonaka
and colleagues (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009) who conceptualize knowledge creation
as a process consisting of two interrelated phases knowledge emergence and knowledge
formalization. Knowledge emergence occurs when existing knowledge boundaries are crossed,
facilitating a cognitive change and development of new insights (Tsoukas, 2009). Knowledge
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formalization involves the reshaping, clarification, and integration of these new insights into the
organizational knowledge system (De Boer, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 1999).
To further our understanding of knowledge creation in HROs, we apply insights from
paradox theory (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Paradox theory recognizes
tensions arising from the coexistence of opposing forces in organizations (Leana & Barry, 2000;
Smith & Lewis, 2013). Paradox turns

away from simplification toward the

relationships between opposing phenomena, creating more complex theorizing. Despite its promise,
however, few studies move from recognizing paradoxes in organizations to theorizing about how
these paradoxes are experienced and navigated in practice (Lewis, 2000). In this study, we
acknowledge paradoxes inherent in our phenomenon of interest and endeavor to understand how
individuals experience and navigate paradoxes to create new knowledge.
Our main contribution is creating a framework of knowledge creation in context that
illustrates the interrelatedness of knowledge emergence and knowledge formalization, and embodies
the paradoxes that individuals navigate to create new knowledge. Although previous research
recognizes the paradoxical properties of knowledge (Kumar, 2011; Leonard Barton, 1992), to our
knowledge, no empirical research has explored the nature of these paradoxes and their formative
importance to the knowledge creation process. Thus, our findings extend theory in three ways. First,
we extend understanding of knowledge in organizations by explicating three levels of paradox
embedded within the knowledge creation process: paradox of knowing that exists in the tension
between the known and the unknown; paradox of practice that illustrates the struggle associated with
the integration of the new insights; and paradox of organizing that encapsulates tensions related to
the organizational structure. Second, in providing a clearer, theory-driven definition of HROs, we
extend theory by illustrating (1) the nature of interdependencies that make HROs hazardous and, (2)
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the paradoxes embedded in this context. Finally, we interweave our findings with the literature to
problematize the current understanding of knowledge in organizations and theorize how insights
from HROs may extend to non-HRO contexts.
USING A PARADOX LENS TO UNDERSTAND KNOWLEDGE CREATION IN HROS
Paradox Theory
Organizational research tends to favor consistency, linearity, and stability to allow for more
elegant theorizing and consequently, more precise implications (Whetten, 1989). Yet, this elegant
theorizing is often critiqued for its inability to capture the complexities and paradoxes inherent in
social organizing (Eisenhardt, 2000; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith & Lewis, 2011). To this end,
embracing paradox can be useful as it may facilitate generation of new theoretical and practical
insight (Farjoun, 2010; Lado, Biyd, Wright, & Kroll, 2006). For example, Smith and Lewis (2011)
survival is partially dependent on its ability to respond to paradoxical
tensions; Lado et al (2006) suggest that the theoretical and practical promise of the resource-based
view is possible only when its inherent paradox is embraced; and Coff, Coff, and Eastvold (2006)
emphasize the importance of paradox as inherent to the management of organizational knowledge.
Paradox is the coexistence of two opposing states that are logical in isolation but irrational
when placed together (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Even a cursory view of
organizational literature is sufficient to recognize that this coexistence permeates the most
fundamental organizational issues such as the struggle between innovation and efficiency

change and stability (Farjoun, 2010; Leana & Barry, 2000), or the known and the unknown (Bass &
Chakrabarty 2014;

For example, the paradox of change

and stability allows researchers to transcend the question of whether organizations are stable systems
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or a result of emergent activities (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009) by
interrelating the tension between regularity (stability) and adaptability (change) (Eisenhardt, 2000;
Leana & Barry, 2000). Embracing paradox provides insight into how moderate experimentation
(change-oriented activities) can foster increased reliability (stability-oriented activities) (Farjoun,
2010) and why routine procedures may be critical for working through the nonroutine (Pentland,
Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012).
Organizations also tend to experience a continuous struggle between what is already known
and what needs to be discovered. This paradox of known and unknown emerges as contexts change
and new problems arise,
2008; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Knowledge that once enabled success may subsequently play a role in
organizational failure through galvaniz

Barton, 1992). To this end,

previous research emphasizes errors as triggers to break rigidities imposed by previous understanding
(Catino, & Patriotta, 2013; Zhao, 2011). New knowledge is created as errors are detected, corrected,
and analyzed thus expanding the repertoire of available responses (Farjoun, 2010; Madsen, 2009).
Although new knowledge creation through the analysis of errors is useful

-

organizations (Edmondson, 1999), this may not be viable in contexts in which errors generate
hazardous consequences, such as HROs (Bierly & Spender, 1995; La Porte & Consolini, 1991).
Thus, a tension exists in the need to create knowledge via exploration and discovery (both of which
are often error-laden) while maintaining error-free, reliable operation. Recognizing this, Roberts
(1990: 160addressing phenomena at least partially derived from precisely the opposite conditions
High-Reliability Organizations
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Research on HROs stems from work on high-risk systems (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Perrow,
1984), or systems that (1) have potential to create hazardous consequences such as large-scale
accidents and fatalities; (2) are characterized by complex interactions; and, (3) are tightly-coupled.
Complex interactions are
-coupled entails
the proximity between interacting components so that what happens in one affects what happens in
another. In essence, risk is created in this context because of the existence of interacting components
that can produce unplanned or nonroutine events that are difficult to immediately comprehend.
Although Perrow (1984) did not differentiate between hazard, risk, and reliability, subsequent
research recognized that although high-risk organizations are capable of catastrophes, rarely does one
in fact occur (Leveson et al., 2009; Roberts, 1990; Wieck & Roberts, 1993). Indeed, although these
organizations are high-hazard in the sense that they have high potential to generate catastrophic
events, the risk is low because the probability that such event will take place is minimized though
emphasis on reliability (La Porte & Consolini 1991; Roberts, 1990). This insight shifted exploration
from what makes these organizations risky to what makes them reliable (Bierly & Spender, 1995;
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld 2008). Reliability in HROs expounds from technical expertise, systemwide processes, and a strong focus on learning (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990). Weick
et al (2008) further suggest that what makes HROs reliable is full attention on failure and emphasis
on complex understanding, resilience, and appreciation of experience when faced with potentially
catastrophic events.
Despite this focused description, the HRO term has been applied in less precise ways many
complex, tightly-coupled systems are in fact not hazardous, and many hazardous systems are looselycoupled with low accidents rates (Leveson et al., 2009). We build on previous HRO research and
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define HROs as organizations that are capable of producing catastrophes (not just errors but
consequences that can endanger multiple constituents) but are also characterized by system-wide
processes (i.e., knowledge creation) that help maintain mistake-free operation despite their hazardous
nature (Farjoun, 2010; Leveson et al., 2009).
Knowledge creation in HROs. The HRO context requires individuals to oscillate between
applying knowledge in predictable, routine events and creating new knowledge in unpredictable,
nonroutine events (Bigley & Roberts, 1991). Although previous research recognized that knowledge
facilitates reliability in HROs (La Porte & Consolini 1991; Weick et al., 2008), insight into how this
occurs is fragmented at best. For example, studies suggest that when prior experience is relevant to a
problem, individuals rely on that experience to generate a timely solution (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006;
McIver et al., 2013). An assumption is that individuals have complete knowledge and are able to
enact that knowledge appropriately (McIver et al., 2013). However, this assumption may not hold for
several reasons. First, individuals may lack the relevant knowledge due to deficiencies in training or
preparation (Leveson et al., 2009). Second, the problem may not be part of the current organizational
knowledge repertoire (i.e., the problem is unknown) (La Porte & Consolini 1991). Third, the context
may be dynamic, requiring more variety in response to generate the solution (Farjoun, 2010). Here,
we focus on the creation of new knowledge when faced with unknown problems in the dynamic
HRO context.
Circumstances often arise in HROs where unknown problems necessitate the creation of new
knowledge. In non-HRO contexts, small errors and near misses are often useful in creating new
knowledge in response to unknown problems (Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002; Dillon &
Tinsley, 2008; Farjoun, 2010; Morris & Moore, 2000). However, errors and near misses may
produce catastrophic consequences in HROs due to their dynamic nature. In HROs, new knowledge
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must be created through the focus on reliable, error-free operation. Therefore, we have somewhat
contradictory understanding of (1) how individuals work through problems without errors to generate
new knowledge, and (2) how new knowledge is formalized and integrated into the organizational
knowledge system. In this paper we illustrate a two-phase process through which new knowledge is
created in an HRO.
RESEARCH METHODS
Research Setting
General HRO context. The setting for this study is a hydroelectric energy producer,
Marion is composed of four units comprising nine
hydroelectric energy power plants that are functionally interconnected and interdependent with one
another:

At the time the BB unit began

operation in 1966, it was one of the largest hydroelectric power producers in the region. Over time
(1974-1982), a series of additions and reorganizations (CAC and ZB merged with BB in 1992 and
the LIM system was added in 2005)
and reliable operation across all plants. Cross-plant meetings and integrated reliability procedures
capability as well as ensured a more standardized approach to safety.
Marion is an HRO because, on one hand, it is capable of experiencing hazardous events, but
on the other, it maintains relatively reliable performance through system-wide processes. The
potential to produce hazardous events stems from the dangerous materials individuals work with and
the large machines that are interconnected and can, as our participants indicated, act unpredictably.
To maintain reliable performance, Marion has specific procedures for operation, extensive training
and debriefings, and invited safety inspections. This preoccupation with reliability (Weick et al.,
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2008) ensures the most appropriate conduct permeates all organizational levels from engineers
working directly with the machines to executives overseeing the organization.
Local context. Nested within the general HRO context is the event-specific local context.
Due to the hazardous and continually changing nature of the plants in the Marion system, events
occur that, if not immediately attended to, could result in system-wide failure. In some instances,
those events are routine in the sense that individuals have encountered them before and can utilize
current knowledge to neutralize them. In other instances, the events are nonroutine with unknown
causes, rendering current knowledge incomplete and requiring the generation of new knowledge.
Routine events (such as precautionary adjustments, fine-tuning, or minor problems) are
important because they prevent serious consequences from occurring. Although routine events are
often viewed as stable and repetitive activities that ensure consistency in organizing, they are also
dynamic, thus precluding the existence of any two perfectly similar routine events and inciting slight
adjustment and adaptation of individual

actions (Cohen, 2007; Pentland et al., 2012;

Turner & Rindova, 2012). Due to the dynamism embedded in the routine events, knowledge created
through them entails a refinement and/or augmentation of current knowledge.
Nonroutine events often arise as small, controllable problems but have the potential to
escalate into system-wide catastrophes because the nature of the problem is not immediately known.
As such, relying on existing knowledge is insufficient in this situation. New knowledge must be
created in order to define the event and neutralize it to avoid error and maintain reliable operation of
the plant (Garud et al., 2010; Tsoukas, 2009). To contextualize our findings, we begin with a
description of an instance in which a routine event rapidly transformed into a nonroutine event.
During a scheduled inspection of the BB power plant, a mistake triggered a series of
unexpected, catastrophic events. During this inspection, an individual

of the
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equipment sparked observation that oil levels in the power switch were low. Rather than initially
inquiring into why this was occurring, this individual reached over for closer inspection. In doing so,
the routine event (low oil levels) escalated into an extremely hazardous nonroutine event. The

individual closed the electric circuit, resulting in electric shock and serious bodily injury.
The supervisor and two other employees rushed to the individual and immediately
administered first aid. Other workers, though visibly disturbed by the event, had to refocus their
attention and tend to the malfunctioning machine that now was acting completely erratically. At this
point, standard procedures did not aid in the analysis and response to the problem. This was because
the problem, at this point, was nonroutine. The workers engaged in initial inquiry to discover
distinctive characteristics of the event and coordinate insights by sharing and recombining their
experiences. The next 10 hours were critical. The team stayed on the premises, carefully adjusting
the machine through knowledgeable action, while simultaneously tending to the accident. Once a
preliminary solution was generated, the supervisor immediately contacted BB plant executives to
arrange a localized meeting so that the emergent insights could be refined and integrated into the
formal knowledge structure. We utilize this event in the coming paragraphs to contextualize our
findings.
Data Collection Procedures
capture the
the process. We conducted an instrumental case study (Stake, 1995) and used
multiple sources of data including formal interviews, informal conversations, observations, and
archival data such as internal documents, governmental reports, and news articles. Triangulation of
data sources improved the robustness of the findings (Creswell, 2007).
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Interviews. The primary data source was 17 semi-structured interviews conducted one-onone with participants either in their private offices or in a meeting room in Marion. In addition, we
talked to participants informally during observation and transportation to different units in the
Marion system (distances ranged from several minutes to two hours away). We first interviewed the
General Counsel and the Health and Safety Manager. These individuals were our key informants
because they are highly knowledgeable about Marion, its practices, and events that occurred
throughout its history. In the second round of interviews, we spoke with the general managers of
each power plant. From there, we used a snowball sampling technique to identify others who were
involved with, or had substantial information about, knowledge practices in Marion. The
interviewees were predominantly male (15 males and two females the workforce was
predominately male) averaging 15 years of experience with Marion.
Observation. The first author spent every work day for the first four weeks of the study at
the site, traveling between plants and spending time with employees both at and outside work.
During this time, the first author had several opportunities to observe meetings as well as employee
interactions. Observation allowed us to gain insight into the regular operation of the organization as
well as appreciate its tightly-coupled and hazardous nature. Observing the machines and the
interaction of engineers with the machines allowed us to further contextualize our findings as well as
to experience practice from the view of the participants. An observational protocol was used to
-related activities (Creswell, 2007).
Archival data. Though we did not rely extensively on archival data, they provided useful
historical information that helped us appreciate

hazardous nature. Particularly helpful was

documentation tracing the history of the organization, documentation describing the nature of the
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equipment, and a book containing performance and safety information for each plant over the past 20
years. Archival data also highlighted the importance and continuous revision of safety procedures.
Data Analysis
Driven by the extant literature, we started data collection with the intent to understand how
individuals in Marion make decisions (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson et al., 2009). However,
when we asked if there is anything we need to know that we did not cover in our questions, our key
informants replied that to understand Marion we must understand the importance of knowledge for
reliable operation. Based on this insight, we revised our research question and successive data
collection activities. Subsequent stages were marked with iterative movement between data
collection, data analysis, and the literature to refine the logic of our emergent themes.
In the initial stages of our analysis, we focused on three categories of codes: expected codes
(e.g., interaction of more and less experienced individuals; the importance of noticing unusual
signals), surprising codes (e.g., flexibility rather consistency of experience), and unusual codes (e.g.,
paradoxes that individuals experience and navigate to create new knowledge) (Creswell, 2007).
Initial codes formed the first-order codes in the data structure. In the following stage, we used the
coding process to generate a description of the setting and identify researcher-induced themes
embodying the knowledge creation process (Creswell, 2007). This gave rise to second-order codes
that allowed a more holistic understanding of the data (Bansal & Corley, 2012). Our approach to
coding resulted in the data structure reported in Table 1. In the last stage, we interwove the
interpretation of the findings with the literature to construct the final narrative.
---------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
----------------------------------------------
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To confirm the validity of our findings, we utilized triangulation, member checking, and
thick description (Creswell, 2007). First, we searched for convergence across different sources by
interviewing individuals from different levels of the hierarchy and from different plants. We
triangulated our findings with observational and archival data. We also asked our informants if the
themes that we identified made sense and whether our overall description reflected their experiences.
This resulted in further refinement of our findings. Finally, we employed thick description in the
presentation of our findings. We provide rich, detailed, emic insight into the practices that constitute
knowledge creation in Marion as experienced by our participants.
FINDINGS
To illustrate the knowledge creation process in HROs, we present our findings in two phases:
Phase 1 knowledge emergence; and Phase 2 knowledge formalization. Our findings show that the
knowledge creation process takes on two separate paths depending on the local context (routine or
nonroutine event) (Figure 1). During the knowledge emergence phase (Phase 1) occurring within
routine events, individuals rely on their experiences, recombination of those experiences, and
localized discourse to select the most appropriate solution from an existing knowledge repertoire and
adapt it to the contingencies of the situation. Once the solution is selected and adapted, the
formalization phase (Phase 2) entails the refinement and/or augmentation of the informal knowledge
structure. Conversely, during nonroutine events, the knowledge emergence phase (Phase 1) involves
individuals first defining the problem through initial inquiry and coordination then combining their
experiences through knowledgeable action in order to generate, rather than select, a solution tailored
to the situation. In nonroutine events, the knowledge formalization phase (Phase 2) involves
immediate discussion of the solution via localized meetings, leading to prompt integration of the
emergent insight into the formal knowledge structure.
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---------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
----------------------------------------------

Our findings reveal that individuals experience three levels of paradox individual,
collective, and organizational in the knowledge creation process. At the individual-level, the
paradox of knowing uncovers the struggle individuals experience as they work to categorize an event
as routine or nonroutine and generate a preliminary understanding of the problem. At the collectivelevel, the paradox of practice uncovers the struggle embedded in the distributed nature of knowledge
in action and the coexistence of the formal and informal knowledge structures. Finally, at the
organizational-level, the paradox of organizing uncovers the tension between stability and change
that permeates the entire organization, thus shaping the knowledge creation process in its entirety.
These paradoxes are depicted in Figure 2
our findings, while others are provided in Table 2.
---------------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
---------------------------------------------Phase 1 of the Knowledge Creation Process: New Knowledge Emergence
The importance of knowing existing procedures in Marion is exemplified in the written rules
and procedures posted on the walls of each plant in view of the employees on their way to the
machine area. Employees interweave these procedures in their work in order to ensure reliable
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performance. However, the complex nature of Marion occasionally generates unpredictable and
nonroutine events in which current procedures may not be applicable. When they occur, individuals
sufficient individual know(Weick & Roberts, 1993: 366), collectively decreasing the possibility of catastrophe. In exploring
how individuals in Marion heedfully interrelate to create new knowledge, we discovered five themes:
continual awareness, initial inquiry, coordination processes, experience, and knowledgeable action.
Continual awareness (dimension 1 of the knowledge creation process). HROs are
fundamentally dynamic in that even the most routine events and slight irregularities may quickly
transform into hazardous ones (La Porte & Consolini 1991; Perrow, 1984). In this context, changes
are seen as warning signs that ought to be evaluated to prevent failure (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008;
Farjoun, 2010; Turner & Rindova 2012). As a consequence, individuals must continually be aware of
their surroundings and attune to familiar and less familiar signals.
This awareness coupled with prolonged, careful observation of the behavior of the machines
and understanding how the machines should behave (e.g., normal idiosyncratic sounds versus
abnormal sounds that suggest immediate correction is needed) enables individuals to anticipate when
out of the blue

threats to reliable operation. As such,
their operations. During observations they focus on (1) visual cues; (2) sounds; (3) smells; and, (4)
movements, relying on their knowledge to differentiate between those that are regular from those that
are irregular. The reliance on all senses is not surprising, as previous research implies that acute
awareness stems from the senses, enabling individuals to anticipate and respond to situational
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changes (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Tsoukas, 2009). Acute awareness enables Marion employees
to recognize cues that something me be out of ordinary:
heard a sound coming
from the turbine that was somewhat different than normal and instantaneously notified
However, continual awareness does not, in itself, allow individuals to categorize the event as
routine or not. For example, in the event described above, the engineer engaged in continual
awareness by noticing that the oil levels in the power switch were unusually low. The awareness
allowed the engineer to notice the irregular signal, but was insufficient, as subsequent events indicate,
to properly categorize the event. In order to do so and correspondingly trigger the appropriate set of
actions, individuals must engage in initial inquiry.
Initial inquiry (dimension 2 of the knowledge creation process). Once they notice an
irregularity, employees in Marion engage in questioning to generate a preliminary understanding and
classify the event as routine or nonroutine. Immersion into a dialogue with knowledgeable others
fosters a setting in which individuals question their own assumptions and search for links between
contradictions and diverse insights (Ford & Ford, 1994; Smith & Lewis, 2011). These links establish
shared understanding that enables context-specific actions (Turner & Rindova, 2012). Initial inquiry
is akin to

in that individuals flip through their

mental repositories as well as the repositories of others to form connections between their know-how
and the contingencies of the situation. This inquiry is dialectic with questions spiraling out of other
questions until the individuals tentatively agree on the categorization of the event.
As demonstrated in Figure 1, when the event is categorized as routine, initial inquiry acts as a
recollection mechanism through which individuals exploit collective knowledge and build initial
insight necessary to incite the appropriate action. In routine events, individuals transition relatively
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quickly from initial inquiry to recombination of their diverse experiences to select the most
appropriate solution from the repertoire of current knowledge practices (Figure 2). The transition is
particularly vague as the recombination of experiences commences almost simultaneously with
initial inquiry. The fact that the

, and at times

complexity, of routine events, which consequently creates a space for new knowledge emergence
. A plant manager explained the process:
estimate that the issue is simple, and when there is already a procedure in place,
understand, the solution is never the same. There always need to be explanation of why this
In contrast, as depicted in Figure 1, when the event is categorized as nonroutine, individuals
utilize initial inquiry to

Individuals

make sense of their experiences by engaging in thought experiments, contemplating what could have
been and what could happen in the future (Morris & Moore, 2000). Determining what the event is
not is a form of a thought experiment in which individuals utilize their knowledge not to select the
solution (as in routine events), but to explore the boundaries of the event and discard irrelevant
information. By exploring what the event is not, individuals minimize opportunities for inappropriate
action (this process did not take place in our example, resulting in improper action). One engineer
stated
unsure what is happening, I always consult with others.
Coordination processes (dimension 3 of the knowledge creation process). In routine
events, individuals rely on their experiences and recombination of those experiences to select the
most appropriate solution to resolve the issue (Schulz, 2001). In contrast, during nonroutine events,
initial inquiry transitions into coordination processes during which individuals collectively build
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understanding about the event. They do so by dynamically iterating between various alternatives
(Leveson et al., 2009; Smith & Lewis, 2011), facilitating a string of microadaptations in an effort to
form preliminary agreement regarding what the event is. This is in line with what Weick (1987) and

person in the collective is both an individual observer and a dependent of the collective. As multiple
individuals engage in raw talk and adju
Spender, 1995). To support this, one of our participants explained that even those with the most
experience cannot know everything. Individuals must ask questions and listen to others (i.e., adjust to

coordination between me and the manager, either technical or production manager and a few
others
Individual-level paradox: Paradox of knowing in the knowledge creation process.
Continual awareness is a trigger for the knowledge creation process. Once individuals become aware
of the event, initial inquiry enables them to codify it as routine or nonroutine, thus activating one of
the two paths of knowledge creation (Figure 1). This process also gives rise to the individual-level
paradox: paradox of knowing. That is, the awareness of the event requires timely action often
within minutes. However, improper action may have grave consequences, as illustrated in the
example above. As such, individuals must simultaneously utilize and question their current
knowledge to make appropriate distinctions and generate a preliminary understanding of the event
(routine or nonroutine). Previous knowledge is critical because it allows them to identify known
patterns (Farjoun, 2010; Pentland et al., 2012). At the same time, failure to challenge existing
knowledge may result in premature action and potential escalation of the event. Consequently,
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individuals must resist simplification and remain in a state of paradox between the known and the
unknown that is, paradox of knowing. Given this, we offer the following proposition:

simultaneously questioning it builds understanding and decreases the possibility of error
during knowledge emergence.
In the context of nonroutine events, initial inquiry acts as impetus for coordination processes.
In this transition, individuals open up space for multiple interpretations of what is happening by
interweaving their insights with that of others. Individuals rely on their knowledge to critically
evaluate the knowledge of others as they identify known aspects of the event and search for ways to
infuse new sense into the situation. In doing so, individuals simultaneously reinforce and challenge
, on one hand, solidify what is known, and on the other, prevent
previous knowledge from clouding discovery. Given this, we propose:
Proposition 1b: In HROs, when the event is unknown, simultaneous sharing and challenging
of insights from multiple individuals through coordination processes expands the knowledge
base while decreasing the possibility of error.
Recombination of experiences (dimension 4 of the knowledge creation process).
Experience is a driving force behind initial inquiry and the ability to dynamically adjust to others to
comprehend the event. It enables individuals to more clearly articulate what the event is not by
comparing it to events that have occurred previously (Morris & Moore 2000). For example, Langley
and Tsoukas (2010: 4) argue that experiences incorporate the past and the present:
substances, which do not include one another but are seen as nested, standing under one another
sub-stantia experiences include other experiences and grow out of the integration of bodily and
mental events into something new In other words, individuals recombine their various experiences
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and make them relevant to the local contingencies (Schulz, 2001). Indeed, recombination of
experiences tends to enhance reliability in contexts facing frequent perturbations and
unpredictability, such as HROs (Farjoun, 2010).
B

ensures the

active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of
perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the correctness of practices and their constancy over
. However, rather than constancy of practice, experience at Marion
enables flexibility of practice. Flexibility of practice is evident in the
practice, their anticipation of what might happen next, and their adjustment to that anticipation
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Lewis, 2000). Whether in a routine or nonroutine event, individuals
know that they must at least partially adapt (routine events) or critically challenge (nonroutine
events) each practice. Flexible experience allows individuals to make the knowledge relevant to a

on your extensive experience, you know how to

Knowledgeable action (dimension 5 of the knowledge creation process). During routine
events, knowledgeable action entails application of the selected solution to neutralize the event.
Based on initial inquiry and recombination of experiences, individuals collectively identify the most
appropriate solution that is then carefully applied to the problem (McIver et al., 2013). Thus, there is
a distinct separation of thought and action. In contrast, during nonroutine events, the separation of
initial inquiry and recombination of experiences is blurred, making it difficult to discern where one
begins and the other ends. Questioning and coordination are still occurring at the moment individuals
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[that] practitioners obtain a clearer understanding of what

they do by becoming aware of the distincti
Articulation occurring during questioning and coordination allows individuals to more fully
comprehend what is transpiring and enact their knowledge in a more mindful manner, thus
decreasing the possibility of error.
The action, in turn, generates pieces of information to be internalized for new knowledge to
emerge. During routine events, the incoming pieces of information reinforce and augment the current
knowledge structure. These minor adjustments become a part of the collective understanding. During
nonroutine events, incoming pieces of information catalyze new knowledge emergence. The action is

(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Pentland et al., 2012). That is, individuals can understand the situation
only through their actions, and actions can be known only after they occur (Sandberg & Tsoukas,
2015). The influx of novelty relaxes current understanding, opening up space for knowledge
emergence. One of our informants described knowledgeable action as inseparable from problem
solution:
discussion with the men on the floor we decided to turn the aggregate off, but the problem
o more
Collective-level paradox: Paradox of practice in the knowledge creation process. As
much as experience drives initial inquiry and coordination, inquiry and coordination also enrich
experience. Our participants de

less experienced

employees. To this end, participation in these events provides those with less experience an
opportunity to interact with more experienced individuals, highlighting the importance of flexibility,
rather than constancy, of practice and appreciation for the ambiguity of their work (La Porte &
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Consolini, 1991). At the same time, however, less experienced individuals play a key role in
facilitating questions and challenging the current understanding. Indeed, the blending of more and
less experienced workers aligns with the idea that organizational
more levels of experience are connected, as when newcomers who take nothing for granted
interrelate more often with old-

(Weick & Roberts, 1993: 336).

In Marion, the interaction between more and less experienced allows individuals to remain open to
new insights and creates a context in which new knowledge can emerge:
working in the KB plant I had a manager who really helped me and with

Although experience is critical in nonroutine events, it is through the enactment of that
experience that new knowledge emerges. As individuals engage in questioning and coordination,
they also consider what an appropriate action might be. Because the problem they face is not fully
known, the most appropriate action is often difficult to identify. Individuals must discover the
appropriate action based on questioning and coordination, and observe what happens after action
occurs. Paradox exists because premature action can lead to deadly consequences. However, without
action, only limited insight is possible, constrained by previous knowledge structures that only
suggest what the event is not. Thus, in nonroutine events, action changes the nature of the problem.
This process of problem solution in the collective-level paradox ultimately shapes knowledge
emergence in this HRO:
Proposition 2a: In HROs, the interaction of individuals with diverse experiences creates a
paradox needed for knowledge emergence while decreasing the possibility of error.
Proposition 2b: In HROs, knowledgeable action triggers the knowledge emergence process
while decreasing the possibility of error.
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Individuals in Marion have extensive knowledge about most everything they do. However,
even a brief moment of inattentiveness and belief that their knowledge is complete can result in
catastrophic consequences. I

synoptic while knowing that they can

never fully achieve [full knowledge] (La Porte & Consolini 1991: 64). In this context, they must
proactively analyze, search, and question their knowledge before, during, and after the event has
taken place. After the emergence of new knowledge, the formalization stage ensues in which the new
knowledge becomes formalized and integrated with the organizational knowledge system.
Phase 2 of the Knowledge Creation Process: Formalization of New Knowledge
T
important step in the knowledge creation process (Coff et al., 2006; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). To
leverage emergent knowledge, an organization must be able to scale and formalize it (Coff et al.,
2006). As illustrated in Figure 1, in Marion, the knowledge formalization phase of the knowledge
creation process follows two paths. New knowledge created during routine events is integrated in the
informal knowledge structure of each power plant. We term this knowledge structure informal
because it is not formally
entails only minor adjustments to formal procedures. The informal knowledge structure
the situation
(i.e., contribute to and enable flexible experience). Alternatively, new knowledge created during

The informal knowledge structure (dimension 6 of the knowledge creation process).
Despite efforts to standardize practices, each plant approaches its activities and operations somewhat
differently. Those variations stem from the unique history of routine events in each plant. Each
routine event encompasses natural variations requiring adjustments in the patterns of actions
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(Pentland et al., 2012; Turner & Rindova, 2012). Consequently, as individuals apply their knowledge
in routine events, they also adjust it to the specific circumstances (March, 1991; Schulz, 2001). This
adjustment increases flexibility of experience and builds the informal knowledge structure: a
collection of well-understood, yet not formally documented, activities for operation. To this end, the
informal knowledge structure in the plants and across the system exists within the interplay of past
knowledge, present circumstances, and future expectations. An engineer described it

Over time, individuals might launch initiatives to formalize useful informal practices, thus
expanding the formal knowledge base. Launch of these initiatives by individuals is part of
organizational practice. It is the institutionalized manner in which flexibility, changeability, and
continuous development of the formal knowledge structure takes place. Procedures, although
necessary in this context, must be continuously reevaluated in order to remain relevant to new
contingencies. In Marion, individuals continuously work to bring forward new knowledge and
insight and distribute it throughout the organization. Informal knowledge structures are thus an
important platform from which individuals challenge the formal knowledge structure:
something

The formal knowledge structure (dimension 7 of the knowledge creation process).
Procedures that comprise the formal knowledge structure are codified activities that guide reliable
operation in
individuals recognized their necessity. In a casual conversation, one engineer even described how he
often resisted initiatives for standardization and development of the system-wide formal knowledge
structure. He believed that procedures diminish the flexibility necessary for reliable performance.
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However, he stated that he now understands the importance of the procedures to the everyday
operation of his power plant. These procedures facilitate both the awareness of an event, as well as
the initial action aimed at solution selection or generation.
In Marion, new knowledge is formalized in one of two ways. In routine events, individuals
launch an initiative to formalize practices from the informal knowledge structure and integrate them
into the formal one. In contrast, new knowledge stemming from nonroutine events is immediately
considered and formalized. Previous research suggests that organizations might not always capitalize
on knowledge created during past problems because of hindsight bias, or the tendency to
overestimate the amount of information needed to resolve the problem (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008). In
Marion, this bias is minimized because once the nonroutine event is neutralized, those involved
immediately engage in a series of meetings in order to dissect the issue and record everything that
transpired during the event. For example, after the nonroutine event described above occurred, the
plant manager immediately convened a series of meetings with other plant managers and executives.
During these meetings, they discussed what happened during the event, whether the action taken was
appropriate, and how to define the issue. An informant from the LIM system described the process to

have to be present: power plant manager, lead engineer, heads of technical service, as well as
t
We discuss all the things that happened during the day, what was done, etc. Depending on the
issue, we then forward our suggestion to the BB board.
Local meeting

a defining characteristic of HROs. For example, La Porte and

immediately after error identification as well as a series of debriefings during which employees
discuss lessons learned. Similarly, Carroll et al
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critical aspect of corrective action programs. Our findings indicate that local meetings are indeed
important for the formalization of emergent understanding (i.e., lessons learned) and codification of
new knowledge within the formal knowledge structure. Where our findings depart from previous
literature is that, in Marion, local meetings are not necessarily error-driven. The most relevant
knowledge stems from the nonroutine events that were appropriately handled and were error-free.
During these meetings, the nonroutine event is further scrutinized, formalized, and integrated into the
formal knowledge structure.
Collective-level paradox: paradox of practice in the knowledge creation process.
Coexistence of the formal and informal structures gives rise to the paradox of practice in the
knowledge formalization phase (Figure 2). Individuals incorporate both informal and formal
procedures in their practice in order to have more complete, although often paradoxical, knowledge.
The knowledge is paradoxical because the procedures are incomplete, only partially connected, and
occasionally opposing. Formal and informal procedures are by definition incomplete because
complete knowledge in HROs can never be fully attained (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson et
al., 2009). Furthermore, because informal procedures are more malleable, over time the gap between
them and the formal procedures widens. As a consequence, individuals must be mindful of these
differences and navigate them with care. Finally, formal and informal knowledge can also be
opposing. Partially due to the widening gap and partially due to the rigidity of the formal
bureaucracy, informal practices take a different form, thus allowing in
For example, when asked to describe his activities, a plant manager read his job description, smiled,
Employees continuously interweave both
formal and informal knowledge structures into their activities in order to preserve the emergent
nature of knowledge necessary for reliable operation of their plants. Given this, we propose:
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Proposition 3a: HROs are characterized by the interwoven formal and informal knowledge
structures that at least partially oppose one another.
Proposition 3b: In HROs, interrelating formal and informal procedures facilitates error-free
discovery in the knowledge creation process, thus increasing the reliability of HROs.
Organizational-level paradox: paradox of organizing in the knowledge creation
process. HROs are paradoxical because they embody characteristics that are relatively discrete in
more mainstream organizations: certainty vs. uncertainty, application of current knowledge vs. new
discovery, hierarchical vs. decentralized processes, etc. (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; McIver et al.,
2013). HROs have interdependent, tightly-coupled structures necessary for reliable application of
current knowledge, but are also flexible and able to absorb new insights stemming from nonroutine
events. Indeed, individuals in Marion continually oscillate between what they know and what they
must discover. To this end, our findings indicate that what makes the knowledge creation process in
HROs like Marion unique is that the paradox of organizing shapes the entire process. The paradox of
organizing arises from tensions embedded in (1) the pervasive interdependencies of the system, and
(2) the unpredictable, yet hierarchical structure (Figure 2).
Interdependencies of the system contribute to the dangerous nature of HROs (Perrow, 1984).
Specifically, because different segments in the system (machines, other equipment, people, and
plants) are closely connected and often dependent on each other for proper performance, problems
are more likely to escalate. Accidents occur most often not from one malfunctioning part or human
error but from the interaction of diverse components that are closely linked (Leveson et al., 2009).
However, what remains unclear is the nature of the interdependence in HROs and how that
interdependence escalates danger on one hand and shapes knowledge as a reliability-inducing
process on the other (Leveson et al., 2009).
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Our findings indicate that interdependence is multilevel because it permeates individuals,
collectives, and the structure of the organization and paradoxical because it operates in opposing
directions depending on the level it permeates. For individuals and collectives, interdependence is
embedded in the collective recombination of experiences occurring not just during routine and
nonroutine events, but also in everyday practices. Physical separation of offices is practically

floor of the plant or in communal areas than in their respective offices. For example, one of the

system] that just went through unplanned repairs because one of the aggregates was acting up. I got
In other words, interdependence at the individual and collective levels
facilitates knowledge creation and transfer, increasing the reliability of Marion.
In contrast, interdependence at the structural level increases the complexity of the plants
(Perrow, 1999) and contributes to the potential escalation of nonroutine events, decreasing the
reliability of Marion. At the structural level, interdependence is reflected in the manner the plants are
constructed (physical interdependence) as well as their mutual dependence on natural resources
(natural interdependence). Physical interdependence exists in close, daily interaction of machines and
employees. Machines are heavy, large, and with multiple interacting parts necessary for adjustment
to the volatility of the demand for energy. For example, the pumped-storage plant in the BB system
has several interacting parts that take on different roles depending on the demand for electricity.
Natural interdependence extends beyond the organization and is embedded within the landscape in
which the plants are located. A plant manager explained that understanding natural interdependence
is pertinent to the reliable performance of the system:
related. If one experiences irregularities, the other may not have enough water in the
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production, but they all need to function properly in order to maintain the voltage in the
Building on these findings, we propose:
Proposition 4a: Interdependence between individuals and collectives facilitates the
knowledge creation process, increasing the reliability of HROs.
Proposition 4b: Interdependence in the structure increases the complexity of the organization
and possibility for large-scale errors, decreasing the reliability of HROs.
Tensions also surface from the organizational hierarchy. In its emphasis on high-reliability,
Marion is organized as a bureaucracy focused on the application of current procedures and top-down
control. Individuals in Marion see standardized and strictly prescribed practices as key to reliable
performance. Deviation from standard procedure is considered extremely dangerous and strongly
discouraged. In this context, focus is placed on structured and rigid routines and repetition of current
procedures rather than exploration for novelty (McIver et al., 2013). The standardization of practices

very powerful equipment and any error would cause great damage and possibly
stoppage of the whole plant, and if they do not take this into account, people may also
However, in addition to being dangerous and highly controlled, HROs are also continually
evolving and relatively unpredictable. HROs are reliable precisely because they capitalize on the
benefits of bureaucracy (i.e., stringent control systems) while avoiding the inertia of continuous
restructuring that often accompanies bureaucracies (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). Individuals in Marion
often experience multiple issues that interact in a complex manner complex because the origin of
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the issue may not be fully comprehendible a priori and because issues surface simultaneously (or

should strive to be technically correct and safe and to address each and every
element, as well as equipment maintenance, hazardous substances are always an
issue. And then there is highOur findings illustrate the paradox of organizing in HROs that operate in the tension of a
hierarchical, yet adaptive, structure. The paradox of organizing exists because HROs necessarily
operate with a stringent rule-based hierarchy despite their continuously changing, unpredictable
context (McIver et al., 2013). Individuals in HROs must navigate this paradox of control versus
adaptation as they create new knowledge. Building on these findings, we propose:
Proposition 4c: Tensions arising from the rule-based hierarchy and the continuously
changing, unpredictable nature of HROs gives rise to the paradox of organizing.
Proposition 4d: The paradox of organizing in HROs permeates the organization and shapes
the entire knowledge creation process.
DISCUSSION
Contemporary organizations are fundamentally complex and dynamically permeated by
numerous nested paradoxes (Coff et al., 2006; Lado et al., 2006; Smith & Lewis, 2011). To
understand contemporary organizations is to understand how paradoxical tensions may be nested,
how they scale, and how paradoxes at one level (e.g., individual) shape those at another (e.g.,
collective) (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Problematizing organizational paradoxes allows us to build
theories that more fully mirror the complexity faced by contemporary organizations (Eisenhardt,
2000). In this study, we focus on knowledge creation as a fundamental paradox in HROs.
Knowledge is created in paradox because on one hand, it enables one to handle events in most
appropriate manner while ensuring reliability and stability needed for optimal functioning of any
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organization. On the other hand, however, if not continuously challenged, overreliance on current
knowledge may prevent the exploration needed to remain responsive to changes in the internal and
external environments.
In this study, we discover a nuanced approach to knowledge creation that incorporates two
dynamic paths within three levels of paradox. Whereas previous research tends to underplay the
paradoxical nature of knowledge, our findings indicate that paradox is critical to understanding how
individuals transcend the boundaries of current understanding and generate novelty. Perhaps our
most relevant contribution is the creation of a framework of knowledge creation in organizations that
explicates the paradoxes embedded within. We organize our discussion around (1) insights with
regard to the nature of HROs and how those insights may enrich our understanding of non-HROs;
and (2) insights with regard to the paradoxes in the knowledge creation process and how those
insights might extend to non-HROs.
The Nature of High-Reliability Organizations
HROs exhibit a unique organizational context (Roberts, 1990) that may provide theoretical
insights applicable to a wide range of complex organizations. Yet surprisingly little empirical
research has been devoted to understanding their uniqueness. For example, although their tightcoupling and interdependence are identified as key facilitators of hazard (Leveson et al., 2009), there
is insufficient understanding of why. Similarly, there is only fractured understanding of what makes
HROs reliable. In this study, we empirically illustrate the nature of tight-coupling and
interdependence in an HRO as well as identify continuous knowledge creation, rather than
redundancy, as a key platform for reliable performance.
Our findings illustrate two facets of interdependence collective interdependence and
structural interdependence that operate in opposition. Collective interdependence enables
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individuals in HROs to engage in diverse knowledge practices and prevent major failures. In
contrast, structural interdependence increases the complexity of the plants (Perrow, 1984) and
contributes to the escalation of hazardous events. By explicating the nature of the structural
interdependence and providing insight into its two distinct forms physical and natural we extend
current understanding of HROs (Leveson et al., 2009).
Our findings also suggest that continuous knowledge creation facilitates reliable
performance. HROs are strict bureaucracies because this structure allows them to exploit current
resources and apply predetermined procedures most appropriately (March, 1991; Roberts, 1990). At
the same time, our findings indicate that HROs often experience nonroutine events that cannot be
resolved using existing knowledge. When this occurs, individuals must generate novel solutions
through careful interweaving of current knowledge with tentative exploration. The process of new
knowledge creation allows individuals to not just neutralize potential failures before they occur it
also permits the collective to build a repertoire of knowledgeable practices that allows them to notice
and recognize potential cues to failure. Thus, to understand what makes organizations reliable is to
understand how they create new knowledge amidst potential danger.
Extension to non-HROs. Non-HROs tend to value reliability and embody paradoxical
characteristics as well, although to a lesser degree. To this end, insights from HROs may be useful
for theorizing how multiple paradoxes are managed as well as how high levels of reliability are
achieved without sacrificing search and exploration. This is important because, as Lado et al (2006:
capabilities to manage
We offer two theoretical insights that may extend understanding of non-HROs: (1) the
paradox of stability and change, and (2) the dynamism of reliability.
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We uncover how non-HROs work through the paradox of organizing exemplified in the
tension between the need for stability and the need for change (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Similar to
HROs, non-HROs struggle with incorporating variance-inducing practices such as innovation and
flexibility with variance-reducing practices such as reliability and routines (Farjoun, 2010; Feldman
& Pentland, 2003). Simple separation, however, provides only an imperfect solution bureaucracies
can be flexible (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Milosevic & Bass, 2014) and structures may be
instrumental for creativity and innovation (Harrison & Rouse, 2014; Pentland et al., 2012). Our
findings contribute to this stream of research by empirically illustrating how bureaucracies achieve
flexibility and how constraints facilitate new knowledge creation. We show how individuals
interweave standard operating procedures with the discovery process to generate new knowledge and
integrate it with the organizational knowledge system. In doing so, we illustrate the nested nature of
the stability/change paradox that permeates most contemporary organizations (Smith & Lewis,
2011).
Our findings also provide insight into the concept of reliability. In HROs, reliability signifies
failure-free performance. For non-HROs, reliability is evident in consistent service, stability of core
activities, or even the ability to bounce back from environmental shocks (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008;
Farjoun, 2010; Turner & Rindova, 2013). However, in contrast to research that portrays reliability as
a stability-oriented, variance decreasing mechanism, our findings indicate that maintaining reliability
is a daunting task requiring continuous awareness and proactive work. Individuals engage in
numerous microadaptations to accommodate emergent unplanned events and deliver consistency
(Turner & Rindova, 2013). We extend this insight by illustrating how individuals manage paradoxes
inherent in these microadaptations through initial inquiry and coordination. Indeed, initial inquiry and
coordination may be key facets of knowledge creation even in failure-tolerant organizations
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Paradoxes in the Knowledge Creation Process
A critical contribution lies within the discovery of three levels of paradox that individuals
experience and navigate to create new knowledge. To this end, our findings align with previous
research by showing that the continuous interaction between less and more experienced individuals is
important and that continual awareness enables employees to recognize dangerous signals and
appropriately classify them as novel or not (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Our findings also align with the
notion that new knowledge integration with the current system is integral to the knowledge creation
process (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Matusik, & Heeley, 2005; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009).
We extend theory by providing a framework of knowledge creation that explicates three
levels of paradox paradox of knowing, paradox of practice, and paradox of organizing. Paradox of
knowing occurs when individuals experience a deviation in their work that requires them to
simultaneously utilize their current knowledge, challenge what they know, and engage in initial
inquiry to generate preliminary insights into the deviation. Paradox of practice exists in the space
between old and new knowledge in both the knowledge emergence phase (between individuals) and
the knowledge formalization phase (between the formal and informal knowledge structures). The
interplay of formal and informal structures in the paradox of practice gives rise to the overall
malleability of the organizational knowledge system, which is necessary for reliable performance.
Finally, the paradox of organizing embodies the larger organizational context in which
knowledge creation is situated. Centralization and procedural control at the organizational-level can
coexist with individual discovery and the ability to change the system at the individual-level. They
are interrelated, creating the paradox of organizing that individuals experience and navigate to create
new knowledge and ensure continuous reliability. In HROs, individuals might ignore prescribed
procedures when those procedures are categorized as unsafe or irrelevant to the given circumstances
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(Leveson, 1995). However, ignoring prescribed rules can lead to a major catastrophe, and the
distinction between the two is clear only in hindsight (Leveson et al., 2009). By exploring how
individuals interweave contextual contingencies into their knowledge practice, we provide stronger
insight into this distinction. Our contribution lies in illustrating the conditions in which ignoring
procedures enables new knowledge creation and continuous reliability of HROs.
Extension to non-HROs. Experimentation and errors are often portrayed as instrumental in
the knowledge creation process (McIver et al., 2013; Schulz, 2001; Zhao, 2011). In this perspective,
new knowledge is created as errors are detected, analyzed, and resolved. However, this perspective
implicitly assumes that because non-HROs are more failure-tolerant, the benefits of gaining insight
from errors outweigh the costs of making them. As a consequence, non-HROs are required to engage
in cost/benefit analysis and choose between their desire for consistency of performance and new
knowledge creation. By embracing the paradox perspective, however, organizations may be able to
move away from either-or thinking and foster the
for a more holistic, yet paradoxical
approach to knowledge creation.
Doing so is difficult, however, because in an effort to comprehend an increasingly ambiguous
and ever-changing reality, individuals tend to opt for simplicity, creating polarized either-or
distinctions (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2012). As a consequence, when faced with paradox, they
often remove, rather than work through, it. They choose activities that worked in the past, focus on a
single choice, and remove opportunities for further exploration. This in turn reinforces the rigidity of
action and stifles discovery (Lado et al., 2006; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Our findings illustrate
that individuals do not simply follow rules and procedures on one hand, and pursue solution
generation on the other. Nor do they oscillate between standardized and improvised actions. Rather,
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through coordination, individuals interweave constraints with their own experiences and
knowledgeably act to facilitate discovery. Therefore, we provide a more fine-grained depiction of
how individuals work through paradoxes to create new knowledge.
Limitations
Though the topic of this study is timely and increasingly relevant, there are several
limitations that should be addressed. First, there are limitations related to the particularities of our
research methodology. Though qualitative methods offer robustness in detailed, rich descriptions of
organizational life, as observers, immersion in these rich details can never be fully appreciated,
explicated, or communicated. With regard to this particular study, a struggle exists between
providing rich description of our findings and presenting and connecting them with extant research
(Wolcott, 2008). Thus, a limitation of this study, similar to other qualitative research, is achieving
than
imposing analytical elements on our study, we embrace the interplay of individuals and context,
which forms the knowledge creation process in Marion. We attempt to describe this interplay to
highlight the importance of studying both when seeking to understand knowledge creation in HROs.
Second, in effort to focus our study, we had to omit several interesting avenues suggested by

because it enhanced reliability in Marion. Future research could investigate differences in
organizational design and strategic human resource practices that facilitate the rite of passage,
enabling continuous knowledge-driven interaction among less and more experienced individuals. In
addition, our findings indicated that certain individuals took on informal leadership roles in the
knowledge creation process and distributed knowledgeable practices across the plants. Our data also
indicated that conditions under which individuals tend to ignore prescribed procedures is important
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(Leveson et al., 2009). To keep focus on the knowledge creation process as a conduit to reliable
performance, we could not devote significant attention in our narrative to these elements. However,
we do believe these to be fruitful directions for future research. In sum, our findings provide
important implications for theory but also highlight several avenues for research to pursue to extend
our understanding of knowledge creation in context.
CONCLUSION
High-reliability organizations embody a paradox their dangerous and dynamic context can
generate exceptions that require new knowledge without opportunity for learning through failures.
And so we ask: How is new knowledge created in the context where opportunities for exploration
and learning through errors are absent? In pursuing this question, we challenge linear processes of
sequential, identifiable stages of knowledge creation and call for a more dynamic understanding. Our
findings offer that knowledge exists in a dynamic interplay of experience, actions, and interactions
that occur organically as individuals struggle to understand problems under intense pressures. In
doing so, individuals experience and navigate three levels of paradox occurring along one of two
paths in which knowledge is created. We offer an overarching framework of knowledge creation in
context in which complete knowledge can never be attained; yet, the pursuit of complete knowledge
drives continuous action to achieve reliable, mistake-free operation.
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